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While the information systems scholarly and practice literatures both stress the importance of senior executive
engagement with IT management, the recommendations for doing so remain, at best, limited and general. 
Examining the influence of serious IT-related deficiencies on CEO/CFO turnover within the post-SOX financial
reporting context, specific CEO/CFO IT management responsibilities are identified:  CEOs are shown to be
held accountable for global IT management responsibilities, and CFOs are shown to be held accountable for
demand-side IT management responsibilities.  Implications for information systems research, management
research, and information systems practice are provided.
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If war is too important to leave to the generals, the deployment of information
technology is far too important, in 1988, to be left to information technologists.
John F. Rockart (1988, p. 60)
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Introduction
Once seen as a relatively isolated technical function within
firms, the information technology (IT) management realm has
become a broad-ranging domain involving sophisticated
technical and managerial capabilities, multimillion dollar
budgets, and far-reaching implications for business strategies
and business operations (Chatterjee et al. 2001; Feeney and
Willcocks 1998; ITGI 2005, 2008; Nolan 2012).  Recognition
of the strategic and operational importance of IT has led, for
more than 25 years, thought-leaders to call for firms’ most
senior executives to engage personally with IT management
(Bensaou and Earl 1998; Boynton et al. 1991; Feeney et al.
1992; Jarvenpaa and Ives 1991; Rockart 1988).
Indeed, considerable research has examined senior execu-
tives’ engagement in IT management activities (e.g., Jarven-
paa and Ives 1991; Kearns and Sabherwal 2007; Liang et al.
2007; Purvis et al. 2001; Sharma and Yetton 2003).  Much of
this research has, implicitly if not explicitly, applied an upper
echelons lens (Carpenter et al. 2004; Hambrick 2007) empha-
sizing the development of structural, cognitive, and relational
social capitals (Preston and Karahanna 2009) among senior IT
executives, such as the  chief information officer (CIO), and
other senior executives, such as the chief executive officer
(CEO) and the chief financial officer (CFO).  Simplifying
very sophisticated ideas, the logic underlying this body of
research (e.g., Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Banker et
al. 2011; Preston and Karahanna 2009) is:  The greater a
firm’s senior executives’ shared knowledge about IT (i.e.,
about the roles served by IT in maintaining/enhancing the
firm’s competitiveness and about IT management) and the
greater these executives’ mutual trust, the greater is the
likelihood that the firm will be successful in applying IT.
Still, this body of research has tended to describe senior
executives’ engagement in IT management quite generically,
typically applying abstract concepts (e.g., belief structures,
symbolic actions, meta-structuring actions, etc.).  In partic-
ular, little is known about which senior executives should
engage with which IT management activities.  Further, as
insightfully pointed out by Nolan (2012, p. 99) after exam-
ining IT management challenges associated with Boeing’s
787 design and production program, this lack of specificity
combined with the pervasiveness of IT in today’s firms
introduces significant managerial challenges:
IT is everywhere (mostly good) and nowhere (the
bad).  IT is everywhere in that it is deeply inter-
twined in just about everything Boeing does.  IT is
nowhere in that IT leadership is dissipated and frag-
mented throughout the Boeing Corporation, similar
to other global corporations....This is a particularly
difficult issue for current corporate CIO’s whose
direct responsibility for IT leadership has shifted
from a direct responsibility to a fiduciary responsi-
bility similar to CFO leadership. While neither the
CFO nor CIO has direct control over the corpora-
tion’s money assets or information assets, both are
responsible for the overall effective management of
the respective assets.
This situation is only exacerbated when organizations’ most
senior executives choose to delegate most, if not all, IT
management responsibilities to a subordinate specialist, such
as the CIO.
Why do firms’ senior executives choose to delegate IT
management responsibilities to subordinate specialists?
Given the demands of their positions, senior executives have
limited time available to devote to any single area of respon-
sibility (Davenport and Beck 2013).  These executives’ atten-
tion deficits along with the technologically sophisticated
nature of IT management have prompted many, if not most,
firms’ top management teams to delegate much, if not most,
IT management responsibilities to subordinate specialists
(Bensaou and Earl 1998; Feld and Stoddard 2004; Mitra et al.
2011; Sondergaard 2014).
Delegating a managerial responsibility to a subordinate,
however, does not absolve the delegating manager from being
held accountable if and when delegated responsibilities are
poorly handled (Sinclair 1995).  If serious IT deficiencies
arise that threaten a firm’s success or legitimacy, someone
will likely be held accountable and suffer negative conse-
quences.  Senior executives would thus benefit from knowing
the specific IT management responsibilities for which they are
likely to be held accountable if poor IT-related outcomes were
to materialize.  This study’s research question addresses this
issue:  For which IT management responsibilities are
particular senior executives held accountable for serious IT
deficiencies?
Focusing on the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) financial reporting
context, we develop research hypotheses relating the reporting
of serious IT deficiencies with senior executive (i.e., CEO and 
CFO) turnover and then assess these hypotheses via probit
analysis, exploiting the explicitness by which the SOX Act of
2002 specifies CEO and CFO accountabilities.  In doing so,
we make two contributions to information systems research.
First, given empirical findings   demonstrating that particular
senior executives (i.e., the CEO, CFO, and CIO) are held
accountable for specific IT management responsibilities
(respectively, global, demand-side, and supply-side), we
argue that IT management is a polycentric rather than
monocentric activity system.  Second, we extrapolate from
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our findings to provide a fresh gestalt of IT management for
firms characterized by a pervasiveness in IT deployment.
Our study also makes two contributions to the management
literature.  First, we extend research by Arthaud-Day et al.
(2006) to further reduce the causal ambiguity that has envel-
oped empirical findings regarding the relationship between
firm performance and executive turnover (e.g., Finkelstein et
al. 2009; Wisenfeld et al. 2008).  Second, we provide fresh
insights clarifying the nature of the accountabilities retained
by delegating general managers and by delegating functional
managers. 
Conceptual Background
We begin by reviewing three concepts key to our theoretical
arguments:  senior executive roles in modern organizations,
managerial delegation, and the salience of IT within the post-
SOX financial reporting context.
Senior Executive Roles in
Modern Organizations
The upper echelons perspective (Carpenter et al. 2004; Cyert
and March 1963; Hambrick 2007), the dominant theoretical
lens applied in the extensive body of research examining
senior executives’ influences on firms’ actions and outcomes,
holds that (1) senior executives’ influence is attributed to
these individuals’ power and to their serving as the organi-
zation’s primary interface with the external environment and
(2) senior executives’ actions are based on these individuals’
experiences, values, and personalities.  A primary way by
which executives create value (Barney 1991; Penrose 1959)
is through “the creation, evaluation, manipulation, adminis-
tration, and deployment of unpriced specialized scarce
resource combinations” (Lippman and Rumelt 2003, p. 1069).
Especially important resource combinations for today’s highly
competitive landscapes are those comprised of knowledge
assets and innovative capabilities (Grant 1996; Kogot and
Zander 1992), both of which are largely enabled through IT
(El Sawy and Pavlou 2008).
Critical activities involved with knowledge-based value crea-
tion include establishing and maintaining the knowledge
flows necessary for, first, assembling and, then, coordinating
groupings of actors, assets, and capabilities (Zenger et al.
2011).  The organization hierarchy has proven to be an espe-
cially effective means (Arrow 1974; Monteverde 1995) for
facilitating the transport and use of knowledge as the hier-
archy invokes managerial authority (Coase 1937), exploits the
structure of the employment relationship (Barnard 1938;
Ouchi 1980; Simon 1947), and both influences and leverages
organization norms (Blau and Scott 1962; Dalton 1959; Kogut
and Zander 1992).
The organization hierarchy formalizes managerial responsi-
bilities and information rights (Galbraith 1973; March and
Simon 1958) and establishes the managerial authority struc-
ture (Chandler 1962) for allocating scarce resources across
functions and priorities (Pfeffer 1981; Pfeffer and Salancik
1978).  Two distinct senior executive roles exist within
organization hierarchies:  a general manager role and a func-
tional manager role (Guadelupe et al. 2014; Hambrick and
Mason 1984).  The responsibilities of general managers (e.g.,
the CEO, chief operating officer (COO), business unit
president, etc.) emphasize establishing and overseeing
organization-wide policies and strategies (Gore et al. 2010;
Hambrick and Mason 1984) and ensuring an organization’s
strategic flexibility (i.e., the capability to precipitate strategic
change) (Nadkarni and Hermann 2010).  The responsibilities
of functional managers (e.g., “front-office” positions such as
the vice-presidents of sales, of marketing, of operations, etc.
and “back-office” positions such as the CFO, CIO, vice
president of human resources, etc.) involve these same
general manager responsibilities, here limited to a specified




A fundamental aspect of organization hierarchy design
involves the apportioning of managerial responsibilities
between a superior and a subordinate such that the sub-
ordinate possesses the authority to take action (for a delegated
responsibility) without first obtaining the superior’s approval
(Yukl and Fu 1999).  For example, many organizations have
found it desirable to share the CEO role between a CEO and
a subordinate COO (Marcel 2009).  Splitting a managerial
role benefits the superior in a number of ways (Boeker 1992;
Hambrick et al. 2005; Leana 1986; Marcel 2009; Yukl and Fu
1999; Zenger et al. 2011):  the superior’s workload is reduced,
available expertise and perspectives are broadened, decisions
are better informed and more timely, and the superior may
escape negative repercussions if problems arise with a dele-
gated activity.  Splitting a managerial role between a superior
and one or more subordinates may prove especially valuable
when a managerial responsibility requires specialized exper-
tise (Gore et al. 2011; Hambrick et al. 2005; Wood et al.
1990).
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However, splitting managerial responsibilities between a
superior and one or more subordinates introduces at least
three potential threats for the superior.  First, overseeing the
subordinate can prove difficult and costly (Marcel 2009),
especially when information asymmetries (Jensen and
Meckling 1976) are present (e.g., when specialized expertise
is held by the subordinate and when strategy formulation is
separated from strategy implementation).  Second, delegation
increases the likelihood of organizational politics (Milgrom
and Roberts 1990; Pfeffer 1981) and personal relationships
(Uzzi 1996) intruding into decision processes.  Third, sub-
ordinates’ perceptions of a superior’s fairness can negatively
shape subordinate behaviors (Adams 1963).
While an executive might delegate work responsibilities, the
executive is likely to retain accountability for certain of these
responsibilities.  Recognizing this, the mindful executive
would benefit from continuing to engage, in some fashion,
with certain delegated responsibilities in order to moderate
associated information asymmetries (Jensen and Meckling
1976).  Extant management research, however, provides little
guidance for determining those delegated responsibilities for
which continuing engagement would be most beneficial.
Salience of IT Within the Post-SOX
Financial Reporting Context
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)2 was established to
strengthen internal controls over financial reporting by U.S.
public firms and, as a consequence, to increase investor and
stakeholder confidence in published financial reports.  Imple-
mentation of the various SOX provisions has affected deci-
sion processes within U.S. firms as well as within firms
located outside the United States (Bhamornsiri et al. 2009;
Prentice 2007).  Specific to this study, SOX 404 requires an
annual assessment by the firm’s executive management and
external auditor of the firm’s internal controls over financial
reporting (SEC 2003).  Both management and external
auditors must identify the presence of material weaknesses,
where a 
material weakness is a deficiency, or combination of
deficiencies, that results in more than a remote
likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual
or interim financial statements will not be prevented
or detected (PCAOB 2004, para. 10, p. 156).3
In other words, reported material weaknesses are indicative of
a financial reporting system that fails to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the reliability of the prepared financial
statements in accordance with general accepted accounting
procedures (GAAP).  Particularly important for our study, the
SOX provisions mandate that the CFO and CEO be held
accountable for properly executing their fiduciary duties (i.e.,
establishing and maintaining their firm’s internal controls
regarding financial reporting) (Hoitash et al. 2012).
A firm’s financial reporting systems are inextricably linked to
underlying financial information systems (including enabling
technology services) that capture, archive, and transform the
data used in financial statement production (Li et al. 2012).
Serious IT deficiencies can introduce errors with regard to
data and to business rules, which in turn can lead to internal
control problems and to heightened complexity (hence,
greater time and cost) when resolving these internal control
problems (Canada et al. 2009).  Such outcomes are likely to
be observed regardless of whether the identified internal
control problems are intentional (Palmrose et al. 2004) or
unintentional (Scholz 2008).  Clearly, IT “is the foundation of
an effective system of [internal controls over financial
reporting]” (ITGI 2004, p. 21).
Hence, an integral element of internal controls, typically not
considered by extant research on financial reporting mis-
statements (see Eilifsen and Messier 2000), involves IT
management.  In practice, audits of firms’ SOX compliance
seek to identify both non-IT and IT material weaknesses.  The
distinction between these two types of material weaknesses is
illustrated through an excerpt from a SOX 404 report in our
data set.  Here, the first bullet identifies non-IT material
weaknesses and the second bullet identifies IT material
weaknesses:
Controls over the preparation of interim and year-
end financial statements and reconciliation of key
accounts were not effective as of December 31,
2004.  The following specific deficiencies were
identified:
• Staffing levels in the accounting and finance
functions were insufficient given the level of
complexity of the Company’s operations, cor-
porate transactions, litigation, and organization
structure.  Roles and responsibilities within the
accounting function were not clearly defined.
2Refer to Appendix A for an overview of SOX and of the SOX-related
accountabilities of CEOs and CFOs.
3Note that this Auditing Standard No. 2 definition which was in effect for our
sample of firms has been superseded by Auditing Standard No. 5 which
defines a material weakness as “deficiency, or a combination of defi-
ciencies...such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material
misstatement of the firm's financial statements will not be prevented or
detected on a timely basis” (PCAOB 2007, para. A7, p. A1-43).
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• The Company’s information systems were
inadequate to support the complexity described
above due to multiple, incompatible applica-
tions and platforms, manual interfaces and
inadequate IT support staff.
While antecedents and consequences of non-IT material
weaknesses have been the focus of considerable research
examining the effects of the SOX regulations (e.g.,
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Beneish et al. 2008; Doyle et al.
2007; Hammersley et al. 2008), only a few empirical studies
have focused on IT material weaknesses.  Specifically, empi-
rical research has observed that firms with a greater number
of IT material weaknesses have more misstated accounts and
more non-IT material weaknesses (Grant et al. 2008), have a
greater scope of material weaknesses (Klamm and Watson
2009), take longer to correct identified material weaknesses
(Klamm et al. 2012), and produce less accurate management
forecasts (Li et al. 2012).  Such findings are indicative of a
systematic relationship between IT material weaknesses (i.e.,




Our study seeks to identify, within the post-SOX financial
reporting context, IT material weaknesses that increase the
likelihood of turnover for CEOs and for CFOs.  We begin by
developing two hypotheses that associate the likelihoods of
CEO/CFO turnover with the total number of IT material
weaknesses identified in a firm’s SOX 404 report.  Then, we
develop two more-refined hypotheses that associate the likeli-
hoods of CEO turnover and CFO turnover, respectively, with
distinct types of IT material weaknesses.
Influence of IT Material Weaknesses
on CEO/CFO Turnover
A primary obligation of public firms’ boards of directors is to
monitor managerial performance and, as deemed necessary,
to hire, fire, and set compensation for these firms’ senior
executives (Furtado and Karan 1990).  Current explanations
regarding the hiring, firing and compensation of senior execu-
tives draw largely from the upper echelons perspective (e.g.,
Finkelstein et al. 2009), from power and resource dependency
perspectives (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and from labor
market and managerial human capital perspectives (e.g.,
Carpenter and Wade 2002; Castanias and Helfat 2001; Fama
1980).  Research on executive compensation, for example,
nicely illustrates the blending of these theoretical perspectives
in confirming that the managerial talent market values execu-
tives possessing the skills and abilities to orchestrate across
their respective organizations the exploitation of strategic
opportunities and the mitigation of critical problems
(Carpenter and Wade 2003; Castanias and Helfat 2001).
Given that firm performance is seen as a key indicator of
managerial performance, considerable research has examined
the influence of firm performance on both executive compen-
sation and executive turnover.  For the most part, the research
examining the relationship between firm performance and
executive compensation has proved inconclusive, attributed
to numerous intruding contingencies (Finkelstein et al. 2009).
However, research consistently attributes senior executive
turnover to poor firm performance (e.g., Finkelstein et al.
2009; Wagner et al. 1984; Wiesenfeld et al. 2008).  That said,
the studies examining the influence of poor firm performance
on senior executive turnover have operationalized firm perfor-
mance in broad, nonspecific ways—making it impossible to
attribute executive turnover with performance deficiencies
regarding specific executive responsibilities (Finkelstein et al.
2009; Wiensenfeld et al. 2008).
A notable exception is the study by Arthaud-Day et al. (2006)
that examines the influence of financial restatements on
CEO/CFO turnover within the post-SOX financial reporting
context.  When errors are identified in issued financial state-
ments, these in-error financial statements must be corrected,
or restated.  Building on Wiensenfeld et al.’s (2008) ideas
regarding stigmatization processes taken to rectify firms’ loss
of legitimacy, Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) argue
we propose that financial restatements represent a
particularly serious threat to legitimacy, especially
with respect to the regulatory and normative
environments. Because the executives of a firm are
held directly responsible for restatements, we
suggest that removing these stigmatized leaders aids
the firm’s recovery process (p. 1122). 
Arthaud-Day et al. then provided evidence that CEOs and
CFOs in restatement firms were more likely to suffer turnover
than were CEOs and CFOs in non-restatement firms and that
restatement events proved significant in explaining executive
turnover after accounting for the influence of firm financial
performance.4  Arthaud-Day et al. conclude that  “financial
4Related research has produced consistent findings:  restatements are asso-
ciated with stock price declines (Hammersley et al. 2008; Palmrose et al.
2004), suggesting legitimacy losses; and, restatements are associated with
higher rates of senior executive turnover (Collins et al. 2009; Desai et al.
2006). 
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restatements have less causal ambiguity, making it easier to
pinpoint culpability” (p. 1130).
As described earlier, material weaknesses contribute directly
to firms’ issuance of financial restatements, with IT material
weaknesses being especially damaging to firms’ legitimacy as
transaction partners are likely to be concerned that identified
IT deficiencies will require complex, costly and time-
consuming repairs.  Because (1) a firm’s senior executives are
expected by the firm’s board of directors to possess the
requisite managerial skills and abilities to maintain the firm’s
on-going success and (2) effective IT management has
become critical to the on-going success of most firms, we
propose
Hypothesis 1:  Firms reporting greater numbers of
IT material weaknesses will experience greater
likelihoods of CEO turnover. 
Hypothesis 2:  Firms reporting greater numbers of
IT material weaknesses will experience greater
likelihoods of CFO turnover. 
We now extend Arthaud-Day et al.’s work by developing
hypotheses reflecting a finer delineation of the IT manage-
ment responsibilities for which CEOs and CFOs are likely to
be held accountable, thereby removing another layer of causal
ambiguity.  To accomplish this, however, we first partition
firms’ IT management responsibilities into three distinct
domains.
IT Management Responsibility Domains
Synthesizing prior thought (Chen et al. 2010; Feeney and
Willcocks 1998; Ross and Weill 2002; Sambamurthy and
Zmud 2012; Weill 2004), we argue that three primary
domains of IT management responsibilities exist:  a global
domain, a demand-side domain and a supply-side domain. 
Table 1 characterizes these three responsibility domains.
Global IT management activities focus on positioning,
directing, and overseeing enterprise-wide IT policies and IT
strategies in order to set the strategic tone for IT investment,
to optimally leverage IT investments, and to minimize IT-
related risks (Ross and Weill 2002; Sambamurthy and Zmud
2012; Weill 2004).  Here, senior executive engagement is
especially important in resolving the interunit tensions that
arise from resource prioritizations attributed to demand-side
and/or supply-side imbalances—imbalances that can become
intractable if not quickly resolved because of the involved-
executives’ power. 
Demand-side IT management activities focus on stimulating,
prioritizing, and constraining unit-specific demands for IT-
enabled business solutions and enabling technology services.
Typically, these organizational units represent business units,
functional line units, or functional staff units; and both
strategic and operational issues are addressed when specifying
a unit’s IT-related requirements, overseeing the provisioning
of IT-enabled business solutions, and ensuring that these
solutions are aligned with current and planned business
strategies.  Senior executive engagement is especially impor-
tant in resolving two issues resulting from intra-unit tensions
(Fonstad and Robertson 2006; Ross and Weill 2002;
Sambamurthy and Zmud 2015):  determining which business
needs are to be met through unit-wide business solutions and
which are to be met by locally optimized business solutions,
and establishing priorities for competing business needs in the
face of resource constraints.
Supply-side IT management activities focus on provisioning,
operating, and maintaining the (enterprise-wide and unit-
specific) IT-enabled business solutions and enabling tech-
nology services implemented to support and enable an
organization’s business strategies and business operations
(Chen et al. 2010; Sambamurthy and Zmud 2012).  While
such activities might be physically executed by internal
entities (with either an enterprise-wide or localized purview)
or by external entities (e.g., consultancies or service pro-
viders), concerns related to security, interconnectivity, inter-
operability, optimization, and lifetime costs of ownership are
moving most firms toward a greater centralization of supply-
side IT management (Kettinger et al. 2010; Sambamurthy and
Zmud 2012).  Senior executive engagement is especially
important in resolving two issues related to interunit tensions
(Fonstad and Robertson 2006; Sambamurthy and Zmud,
2012):  ensuring that to-be-provisioned technology assets
conform to enterprise-wide technology standards, architec-
tures, and security polices; and allowing unit-level senior
executives confronting demand-side IT management decisions
sufficient flexibility to maintain and enhance their units’
competitiveness.
Influence of Specific IT Material Weaknesses
on CEO/CFO Turnover
Prior research in the post-SOX context suggests that execu-
tives holding specialized financial expertise, such as the CFO,
are likely to suffer greater dysfunctional consequences given
the presence of identified material weaknesses than are execu-
tives in general management roles, such as the CEO (Hoitash
et al. 2012; Hsu and Liao 2012; Li et al. 2010; Wang 2010). 
That said, material weaknesses of a more general nature seem
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Table 1. IT Management Responsibility Domains
Domain Focus Illustrative Decisions
Global
Positioning, directing, and over-
seeing enterprise-wide IT policies
and IT strategies so as to set the
strategic tone for IT investment, to
optimally leverage IT investments,
and to minimize IT-related risks.
• What should the dominant strategic role of IT be?
• What should be the overall level of IT investment?
• Which IT-enabled business solutions and which technology
services should be supported through enterprise-wide digital
platforms?
• Should corporate pay a portion of the cost of innovative, unit-
specific, IT-enabled business solutions?
• How should IT-related business risks be assessed, monitored, and
mitigated?
Demand-Side
Stimulating, prioritizing and con-
straining unit-specific demands for
IT-enabled business solutions and
for technology services.
• How should IT-enabled business initiatives be prioritized?
• How should business cases for digital innovations, for IT-enabled
business initiatives, and for technology services be argued?
• Which business processes and enabling technology services are
sufficiently unique to warrant not having to conform to available,
enterprise-wide digital platforms?
Supply-Side
Provisioning, operating, and main-
taining (enterprise-wide and unit-
specific) IT-enabled business
solutions and enabling technology
services implemented in support
of an organization’s business stra-
tegies and business operations.
• Which technology services should be provisioned through
standardized, enterprise-wide platforms?
• How should technology standards be established and managed?
• Which technology services should and should not be outsourced?
• How should the organization’s technology professionals be hired,
developed, and managed?
• How should technology risks be assessed, monitored, and
mitigated?
to be beyond the CFO’s direct responsibility (Hoitash et al.
2012); and, when CEO and CFO compensation changes are
examined together, Hsu and Liao (2012) find that compen-
sation is reduced more by general, or company-level, material
weaknesses relative to account-specific material weaknesses.5
These observations strongly suggest that boards of directors
penalize CEOs and CFOs differently for reported material
weaknesses, based on the natures of the disclosed material
weaknesses and on the distinct fiduciary responsibilities of
CEOs and CFOs.  We extrapolate these findings to argue that
boards of directors are likely to differentially penalize CEOs
and CFOs given the natures of disclosed IT material
weaknesses.
What are the IT management responsibilities for which boards
of directors are likely to hold CEOs accountable for poor
performance?  The most distinctive responsibility of the
CEO’s general management role is that of ensuring an
organization’s strategic flexibility (Nadkami and Hermann
2010)—that is, an organization’s capability to precipitate
strategic change.  Information systems scholars (e.g., Arm-
strong and Sambamurthy 1999; Kettinger et al. 2010;
Pralahad and Krishnan 2002; Ross 2003; Ross et al. 2006;
Tallon and Pinsonneault 2011) have argued compellingly that
an organization’s strategic flexibility is inextricably linked to
the existence of a scalable, adaptable enterprise architecture
enabling:  secured-access to shared data repositories and to
robust portfolios of rationalized information systems and their
enabling technology services; the seamless integration of
these information systems; and, an ease of modifying existing
information systems and of implementing new information
systems.  In the absence of well-tuned enterprise architec-
tures, organizations’ collections of installed IT-enabled
business solutions become
so complex that any change required individually
rewiring systems to all the other systems they con-
nect to.  Developing and testing new capabilities in
such a complex environment is time consuming and
every change becomes a risky, expensive adventure
(Ross et al. 2006, p. 11).
Ensuring organizations’ strategic flexibility through well-
tuned enterprise architectures captures a core aspect of global
IT management responsibilities, given that a primary aim of
enterprise architectures is to more-fully leverage an organi-
zation’s IT investments and to lower strategic risks (Ross et
al. 2006).  As the aims of enterprise architectures are often at
5Hsu and Liao do not present or discuss results for CEOs and CFOs
separately.
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odds with the demand-side strategies of unit-level senior
executives (Shpilberg et al. 2007), the CEO is typically the
only senior executive holding sufficient political and financial
capital to drive significant, global organizational and tech-
nological change (Brown and Vessey 2003; Hirschheim et al.
2010; Kohli and Johnson 2011; Leonard-Barton and
Deschamps 1988; Smith et al. 2010).
We thus expect that boards of directors will hold an organi-
zation’s CEO accountable for global IT management
responsibilities and will penalize the CEO for poor perfor-
mance outcomes regarding these global responsibilities.
Mapping this argument to the post-SOX financial reporting
context,
Hypothesis 3:  Firms reporting a greater number of
global IT material weaknesses will experience
greater likelihoods of CEO turnover.
What are the IT management responsibilities for which boards
of directors are likely to hold CFOs accountable for poor
performance?  Perhaps the most important functional manager
role is that of directing and overseeing the development of a
functional unit’s business strategy along with that of ensuring
integrity of the business operations put in place to achieve this
strategy.  Indeed, this notion lies at the heart of the arguments
raised for line (or functional) executives to “take the lead” in
IT management (Martin et al. 1995; Rockart 1988).  As IT
deployment becomes increasingly pervasive, a dominating
functional-manager responsibility involves directing and
arbitrating the IT-enabled business solutions and the enabling
technology services on which functional strategies and opera-
tions are dependent.  Such an obligation is reflective of
demand-side IT management responsibilities.
We thus expect that boards of directors will hold an organi-
zation’s CFO accountable for demand-side IT management
responsibilities and will penalize the CFO for poor perfor-
mance outcomes regarding these demand-side responsibilities. 
Mapping this argument to the post-SOX financial reporting
context,
Hypothesis 4.  Firms reporting a greater number of
demand-side IT material weaknesses will expe-
rience greater likelihoods of CFO turnover.
Conspicuously missing from our hypotheses is a consideration
of supply-side IT management responsibilities.  Serving as the
senior executive responsible for a firm’s IT function, we
acknowledge that the CIO has been (Chen et al. 2010), and is
expected to continue being, accountable for firms’ supply-side
IT management responsibilities.
Research Methods
The SOX financial reporting context is ideally suited, for two
reasons, for our research purposes.  First, the potential for
negative consequences to arise from CEOs and CFOs being
held accountable for serious IT deficiencies is explicitly
recognized, unlike most other IT management activity
domains where the threat of negative consequences from
serious IT deficiencies is, at best, implicit.  Second, financial
reporting is critically important for all publically owned firms,
unlike many other work activities whose importance varies as
a function of firms’ enacted business models, organizational
fields, and histories.  We collected the data used to assess our
research hypotheses from Audit Analytics (e.g., SOX 404
reports), Annual Compustat (financial statement variables),
SEC financial reports (e.g., DEF 14-A; 10-K), Execucomp
(CEO and CFO variables), and a variety of sources including
the Million Dollar Database, Lexis-Nexis, ZoomInfo, and
Google Searches.
Using data from Audit Analytics, we examined each firm’s
reported material weaknesses and classified each as either an
IT material weakness or a non-IT material weakness.  To
obtain our sample of IT material weakness firms, we first
identified firm-year observations reporting IT-related weak-
nesses in 10-K, SOX 404 audited management disclosures
with fiscal year-ends from November 2004 through December
2007.  We then required that firms have subsequent proxy
filings (DEF 14-A) to the SEC, so we could determine
changes in CEO and CFO positions.  Second, some firms
have IT weaknesses in consecutive years.  If we observed
turnover to have occurred for both the CEO and CFO in the
first year of an IT material weakness, we did not include
subsequent firm-year observations for that firm.6  After this
process, we obtained 278 IT material weakness firm-year
observations. 
After having identified our sample of IT material weakness
firms, we then selected a second group of non-IT material
weakness firms matched on industry, profitability (return on
assets), and size (market capitalization) that reported material
weaknesses but with none of the reported material weaknesses
being an IT material weakness.7  For each firm in our com-
bined data set, we searched SEC proxy statements to identify
6If we observe turnover for only one of a firm’s CxO (either the CEO or
CFO) for a given year’s SOX 404 report, we do not include subsequent firm-
year observations for that particular CxO.
7All but two of the firms in the IT material weakness group report both IT
and non-IT material weaknesses, thus precluding analyses contrasting firms
with only IT material weaknesses and firms with only non-IT material
weaknesses.
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CEO and CFO turnover rates.  Our complete sample consists
of 278 firm-year observations for both the IT material weak-
ness group and the matched non-IT material weakness group.
In assessing our first two research hypotheses, our analysis
strategy involves examining, via probit regression analysis,
whether or not the presence of IT material weaknesses results
in a higher likelihood of CxO turnover while controlling for
non-IT material weaknesses,  whether the CIO reports to the
CEO or the CFO (proxied by estimating the likelihood of the
CIO reporting to the CEO), the extent to which a firm’s CIO
is held responsible for the identified IT material weaknesses
(proxied by estimating the likelihood of CIO turnover), and
other variables previously found to influence CxO turnover. 
In assessing our last two research hypotheses, our analysis
strategy involves identifying (again via probit regression
analysis) specific IT material weaknesses that result in a
higher likelihood of CxO turnover, accounting for the same
control variables used in assessing the first two hypotheses.
The dependent variables are CxO turnover, where x equates
to “E” or to “F” to indicate CEO and CFO, respectively.  CxO
turnover is defined as having a value of one if the incumbent
left the CxO position in the year after (t+1) or two years after
(t+2) the year for which a SOX 404 material weakness was
identified or a value of zero otherwise.8  Thus, for example,
CxO departures associated with fiscal year 2004 SOX 404
reports included departures in 2005 or 2006.
Our primary independent variable is Number of IT Weak-
nesses, that is, the number of material weaknesses identified
in a given SOX 404 report that we characterize as IT defi-
ciencies.  We also use Number of Non-IT Weaknesses, that is,
the number of material weaknesses identified in a given SOX
404 report that we do not characterize as IT deficiencies, as a
control variable.9  While no standards exist regarding the
descriptions to be given to IT and non-IT material weaknesses
in SOX 404 reports, these reports do describe the nature of
each identified material weakness.  Most commonly, a speci-
fic material weakness is described within a separate paragraph
(or bullet); however, in some cases, multiple paragraphs
might be used to describe a single material weakness, and in
other cases all material weaknesses might be described in a
single paragraph.  Such nonstandard reporting practices
present challenges when discriminating between IT and non-
IT material weaknesses and when counting the number of IT
and non-IT material weaknesses.  In our coding process
(described below), we classify a material weakness explicitly
described as at least one IT deficiency as an IT material
weakness; otherwise, the material weakness is classified as a
non-IT material weakness.  Audit Analytics does provide a
total count of all material weaknesses in a given SOX 404
report, which we first verified.  Using this verified number as
the ceiling for the number of material weaknesses identified
in a firm’s SOX 404 report, we were able to confidently
derive counts of the IT and non-IT material weaknesses.
Thus, for each firm, the sum of the number of IT material
weaknesses (Number of IT Weaknesses) and the number of
non-IT material weaknesses (Number of Non-IT Weaknesses)
equals the total number of verified material weaknesses
provided by Audit Analytics.
As the reported IT material weaknesses referenced a variety
of IT deficiencies, we developed a coding scheme to
categorize these IT material weaknesses.  Most firms use
COSO’s 1992 Internal Control-Integrated Framework to
evaluate internal controls (Klamm and Watson 2009), supple-
mented by the COBIT control framework (ITGI 2007) in
examining IT-related aspects.  Accordingly, one of the
authors used the COBIT framework as a lens to enumerate the
specific IT deficiencies described as material weaknesses in
SOX 404 reports.  Next, a practitioner forum was engaged to
discuss the salience of these IT material weaknesses within
the SOX regulatory/audit context.  All four coauthors parti-
cipated in a conference call with nine practitioners (CIOs,
chief technology officers, or senior IT audit specialists) repre-
senting either Fortune 500 companies or major IT audit
consultancies.  Following this conference call, the coauthor
who had enumerated the initial set of IT material weaknesses
met with the practitioner forum’s lead participant (a CTO
active in IT audit research) to apply the spirit of the con-
ference call in revisiting the enumerated IT deficiencies,
producing a list of 35 IT material weaknesses.  Using this list,
this co-author with the assistance of a second coauthor read
each firm’s SOX 404 report to make sure that the IT material
weaknesses were properly coded.  Then, three of the co-
authors engaged in a series of meetings to reach a consensus
on a final set of IT material weakness categories, combining
certain IT material weaknesses to ensure that each was unique
and eliminating certain IT material weaknesses to ensure that
each clearly reflected IT concerns rather than accounting
concerns.  After applying these two criteria, the number of
distinct IT material weaknesses was trimmed to 16.  Li et al.
(2012) have empirically demonstrated the meaningfulness of
such an approach to coding SOX 404 reported IT material
weaknesses.
Appendix B describes an exploratory factor analysis subse-
quently carried out to yield the parsimonious IT material
weakness factor structure depicted in Table 2.  (Appendix B
also describes how the initial set of 16 IT material weaknesses
8We do not set CxO turnover equal to one if a departing CxO is above 65
years old.
9In our probit regressions, we use the natural log of Number of IT Weaknesses
and Number of Non-IT Weaknesses.
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Ensuring that proper internal controls have been established








Ensuring that appropriate capabilities (e.g., employees’
knowledge, work practices, and processes, etc.) exist to
analyze, design, build, implement, operate, and maintain








Ensuring the effective design, development, testing,
installation, and maintenance of financial information




   Systems
Too Complex Systems
Ensuring that enterprise and technology architectures exist






Ensuring that proper controls have been established for the
financial information systems and associated technology
services developed and/or operated by entities other than an
organization’s internal IT function.
aThese IT material weaknesses reference deficiencies explicitly described as being IT-related.  For example, a “Segregation of Duties” IT material
weakness would refer to a single individual carrying out multiple IT-related tasks, each of which should have been segregated across multiple
individuals.
was further trimmed to the 14 listed in the second column of
Table 2.)  In carrying out this factor analysis, we used as data
items the count of the number of times each IT material weak-
ness was reported in a firm’s SOX 404 report for a given year.
Appendix B also provides the justification (see the fourth
column of Table B4) for mapping these IT material weakness
categories to the three categories of IT management respon-
sibilities defined earlier.  Specifically, IT Architecture is
identified as a global responsibility, IT Control Oversight–
Internal is identified as a demand-side responsibility, IT
Control Oversight–External is identified as a supply-side
responsibility, and IT Capability and Software Development
are identified as having aspects of both demand-side and
supply-side responsibilities.
While we are confident in our ability to recognize the exis-
tence of a specific IT material weakness, we are less confident
in our ability to count, for a firm, the total number of distinct
occurrences of a specific IT material weakness.  As a conse-
quence, we operationalize the IT material weakness categories
both as indicator variables and as count variables, and we
produce regression results for both operationalizations.10
Seeking to be as conservative as possible, we apply regression
results for the indicator-operationalization when examining
Hypotheses 3 and 4.  The indicator variables denote whether
or not a firm disclosed at least one of the IT material weak-
nesses in a specific IT material weakness category.
Our primary control variables are Number of Non-IT Weak-
nesses, CIO Reporting Probability, and CIO Turnover Proba-
bility.  Earlier in this section we described our measure of
Number of Non-IT Weaknesses.  Given the results provided by
Arthaud-Day (2006) regarding financial reporting restate-
ments, we expect this variable to significantly predict CxO
turnover.
We also control for whether the CIO reports to the CEO or
CFO.  We expect CEO (CFO) turnover to be higher (lower)
when the CIO reports directly to the CEO.  Data limitations
prohibit us from documenting CIO reporting structure for the
majority of our sample firms. Therefore, we construct a CIO
Reporting Probability variable following the CIO reporting
prediction model developed by Banker et al. (2011).  Using
the 2006 sample period, Banker et al. find that operating
income over sales is positively associated with CIO reporting
to the CEO (rather than reporting to the CFO) and that sales
over assets is negatively associated with the CIO reporting to
the CEO (rather than reporting to the CFO).  Thus, our CIO
10When operationalizing IT material weakness categories as count variables
in our probit regressions, we use the natural log of the counts.
696 MIS Quarterly Vol. 40  No. 3/September 2016
Masli et al./IT-Related Deficiencies and CEO/CFO Turnover
Reporting Probability variable is constructed by taking the
sum of (10.2511 * Operating Income over Sales) and (-1.6118
* Sales over Assets).11
Because of data limitations, we are unable to document CIO
turnover for the majority of our sample firms.  Therefore, we
construct a CIO Turnover Probability variable.  In Appendix
C, we present the results of two probit regression models
predicting CIO turnover using a limited set of our sample
firms for which we were able to locate the needed CIO data.
In Model 1 (Model 2) of Appendix C, we operationalize the
IT material weakness categories as indicator (count) variables. 
We find that the coefficients for IT Control Oversight–
External, Size, Profit, and Board Independence to be signi-
ficant (at a 0.1 probability level) predictors of CIO turnover.
From Model 1 of Appendix C, CIO Turnover Probability is
set equal to zero (one) if the sum of (0.569* IT Control
Oversight–External) + (0.211 * Size) + (-0.016 * Profit) +
(1.405 * Board Independence) is below (above) the sample
median.  From Model 2 of Appendix C, CIO Turnover Proba-
bility is set equal to zero (one) if the sum of (0.748* IT
Control Oversight–External) + (0.206 * Size) + (-0.016 *
Profit) + (1.415 * Board Independence) is below (above) the
sample median.12
 
Informed by prior work, we account for additional alternative
explanations of executive turnover by including salient
control variables.  To control for firm size (Size), we use the
natural log of the firm’s market capitalization (in $million). 
Prior research has consistently observed that poor perfor-
mance increases the likelihood of executive turnover (e.g.,
Boeker 1992; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; Puffer and
Weintrop 1991; Warner et al. 1988; Weisbach 1988).  Thus,
we control for Profit, which is measured as the firm’s return
on assets (ROA) ratio.  To further control for the firm’s finan-
cial health, we include Growth, measured as total sales in the
current year divided by sales in the prior year, and Leverage,
measured as total liabilities divided by total assets.  We
control for financial reporting restatements with the variable
Restatement, which is an indicator variable set to one if the
firm reported a restatement during the year of SOX 404
material weakness, zero otherwise.  In addition, we control for
whether the firm received a Going Concern opinion (i.e., an
assessment of a company's inability to continue functioning
as a business entity) from their auditors through the use of an
indicator variable set to one if the firm did receive such an
opinion, zero otherwise.
Corporate governance also influences the likelihood of
management turnover.  Prior research (e.g., Fama and Jensen
1983; Jensen 1993; Weisbach 1988) suggests that when
corporate governance is weak, boards cannot effectively
perform their monitoring functions including those of eval-
uating and replacing poorly performing executives.  Yermack
(1996) provides evidence suggesting that smaller board sizes
are associated with good governance.  In addition, Weisbach
(1988) finds that the firm’s ability to replace CEOs for poor
performance is greater with a higher proportion of outside
directors.  Therefore, we include as control variables the
number of directors that sit on the board (Board Size) and
Board Independence, measured as the number of outside
directors divided by the total number of directors.  We also
include the variable Audit Committee Effective to control for
the strength of the audit committee.  This variable is defined
(inversely) as one if a firm’s SOX 404 report mentioned
significant deficiencies relating to the firm’s audit committee,
zero otherwise.  To control for the monitoring of institutional
owners, we include Institutional Ownership, defined as
percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders.
CxO power may also significantly affect the probability of
executive turnover (Boeker 1992; Shen and Cannella 2002;
Zhang and Rajagopalan 2004).  Boeker (1992) and Jensen
(1993) argue that the board’s ability to discipline the CxO of
a poorly performing firm is curtailed when the CxO has ac-
quired substantial power.  Accordingly, we employ two mea-
sures of CEO power:  CEO pay slice (i.e., the CEO’s pay as
a proportion of that received by top five corporate officers)
(Bebchuk et al. 2011), and CEO as Chairman (i.e., the CEO
also serves as board chairman).  Likewise, we control for
CFO pay slice when examining CFO turnover.  In addition,
the likelihood of turnover for subordinate executives may
increase, through a scapegoating phenomenon (Boeker 1992),
when their superior is powerful and retains their position by
scapegoating a subordinate.  Thus, we control for CEO power
in examining CFO turnover.
We also control for executive tenure, age, and IT expertise in
these CEO and CFO turnover analyses.  CxO tenure is mea-
sured as the executive’s tenure in the year of the SOX 404
report, while CxO age is measured as the executive’s age in
the year of the SOX 404 report.  CxO IT Expert is an indicator
variable set to one if the executive has expertise in IT, and
zero otherwise.13  Finally, we include three year-indicator
11Banker et al. argue that “Operating Income over Sales” is a proxy for a
differentiation positioning strategy and “Sales over Assets” is a proxy for a
cost leadership positioning strategy.
12Due to multicollinearity problems, we cannot include the raw values of
computed CIO turnover probability.  In the subsequent CEO and CFO probit
regressions, we control for CIO Turnover Probability derived from Model 1
(Model 2) of Appendix C when including IT material weakness categories
operationalized as indicator (count) variables.
13We ascertain if an executive possesses IT expertise by reading his or her
biography in the firm’s SEC filings (i.e., form DEF 14A, 10-K).  An execu-
tive possesses IT expertise if he/she has prior experience as a CIO, or other
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variables  to control for time-specific effects (for brevity, the
coefficients for the year-indicator variables are not tabulated
in the tables) and a control variable, Prior CxO Turnover,14
defined for the CEO analysis as one if a firm had already
experienced an instance of CFO turnover subsequent to the
reporting of IT material weaknesses and zero otherwise, and
defined for the CFO analysis as one if a firm had already
experienced an instance of CEO turnover subsequent to the
reporting of IT material weaknesses and zero otherwise.15
Research Results
Descriptive statistics and univariate tests are first described to
provide a sense of the data as well as naïve (i.e., univariate)
observations regarding the influence of IT material weak-
nesses on CxO turnover.  Then, we report the results of probit
regression analyses examining the influence of IT material
weaknesses on CxO turnover, accounting for the presence of
non-IT material weaknesses, of CIO reporting/ turnover
probabilities, and of other variables found in prior research to
be influential in explaining CxO turnover.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics as well as the results of
mean-difference tests between the IT material weakness firms
and the non-IT material weaknesses firms.  The size and
profitability variables for the two groups of firms are not
statistically different, suggesting that our matching procedure
was successful.  The finding that restatements are signifi-
cantly higher with IT material weakness firms relative to non-
IT material weakness firms suggests that the IT material
weaknesses identified in SOX 404 reports are associated with
serious financial reporting problems, adding further credence
to the foundational role served by IT in financial statement
production.  Most important for our research purposes, IT
material weakness firms have greater (p-value < 0.05)
instances of CEO (33.3%) and CFO (47.9%) turnover com-
pared to non-IT weakness firms (CEO = 23.4%, CFO =
38.2%).  These naïve observations are consistent with
Hypotheses 1 and 2.
The correlation matrix is provided in Appendix D.  Tests for
multicollinearity problems within our probit regression
analyses indicated that no such concerns existed. Tables 4 and
5 provide results of the probit regression models examining
the extent to which IT material weaknesses influence the
probability of, respectively, CEO and CFO turnover, con-
trolling for the effects of other variables.16  In Tables 4 and 5,
coefficients for variables were standardized.  The sample used
in these regression analyses combines the IT material weak-
ness firms and the non-IT material weakness firms.  In these
results, Model 1 and Model 2 include the control variables
only.  Model 3 adds the Number of IT Weaknesses variable,
and these results inform the testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2.  In
Model 4 and Model 5, the Number of IT Weaknesses variable
from Model 3 is removed and replaced with the five IT
material weakness categories in assessing Hypotheses 3 and
4 (Model 4 uses indicator variables while Model 5 uses count
variables).
Table 4 provides the results for CEO turnover.  In Model 3,
Number of IT Weaknesses is significant in predicting CEO
turnover (p-value < 0.01).  Thus, the results suggest that IT
weakness firms are more likely to have CEO turnover com-
pared to non-IT weakness firms and that the number of IT
weaknesses is positively associated with the probability of
CEO turnover.  These results provide strong support for
Hypothesis 1.  With regard to the influence of specific IT
material weakness categories on CEO turnover, Model 4
(using indicator variables) shows that IT Architecture (p-value
< 0.01) and IT Control Oversight–External (p-value < 0.05)
are significant predictors—providing moderately strong sup-
port for Hypotheses 3.  Model 5 (using count variables) as
well shows IT Architecture (p-value < 0.01) and IT Control
Oversight–External (p-value < 0.05) to be significant pre-
dictors—again providing moderately strong support for
Hypothesis 3.
Table 5 provides the results for CFO turnover.  In Model 3,
Number of IT Weaknesses is significant in predicting CFO
turnover (p-value < 0.05).  Thus, the results suggest that IT
weakness firms have a greater likelihood of having CFO
turnover compared to non-IT weakness firms and the number
of IT weaknesses is positively associated with the likelihood
IT management positions such as vice president of technology, vice president
of information systems, etc., and/or has prior work experience in an informa-
tion technology firm (e.g., Dell, IBM, Microsoft, software companies, etc.).
14For example, Company ABC had IT weaknesses in 2004 and 2005.  In
2004, there was CEO turnover but NOT CFO turnover.  Thus, for 2005, we
did not track CEO turnover but DID track CFO turnover.  In other words,
Company ABC for 2005 is still included in the sample for CFO turnover
purposes.  Thus, for the 2005 observation in the CFO analysis, the variable
Prior CxO Turnover = 1.
15To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize the variables CIO
reporting probability, profit, growth, leverage, and institutional ownership at
the 1st  and 99th  percentile.  For missing values in our control variables, we
replace missing values with the sample mean.
16We contemplated the possibility that SOX 404 reports would systematically
vary depending on the external auditor.  We tested this by including an
additional dummy variable that equals one for a Big 4 firm and zero
otherwise (as both a main effect and as an interaction with IT and non-IT
material weakness).  We did not find that the type of external auditor to be a
significant determinant as either a main effect or in an interaction with IT and
non-IT material weaknesses.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Variables
IT Weakness Firms (a)




Mean Median Mean Median (a) – (b)
Panel A. IT Weakness Variables
Number of IT Weaknesses 1.719 1.000
IT Control Oversight – Internal 0.633 1.000
IT Capability 0.252 0.000
Software Development 0.502 1.000
IT Architecture 0.112 0.000
IT Control Oversight – External 0.309 0.000
Panel B. CEO and CFO Turnover
CEO Turnover 0.333 0.000 0.234 0.000 **
CFO Turnover 0.479 0.000 0.382 0.000 **
Panel C. Control Variables
CIO Reporting Probability -4.209 -1.833 -4.358 -1.468
CIO Turnover Probability 2.666 2.667 2.470 2.436 ***
CEO IT Expert 0.267 0.000 0.220 0.000
CFO IT Expert 0.274 0.000 0.263 0.000
Number of Non-IT Weaknesses 2.518 1.000 1.928 1.000 ***
Size 5.893 5.726 5.966 5.831
Profit (in %) -8.344 -0.592 -6.493 -0.142
Restatement 0.353 0.000 0.248 0.000 ***
Going Concern 0.053 0.000 0.046 0.000
Growth 1.245 1.122 1.186 1.079
Leverage 0.599 0.588 0.523 0.504 ***
Institutional Ownership 0.592 0.602 0.613 0.602
Audit Committee Effective 0.039 0.00 0.007 0.000 **
CEO as Chairman 0.536 1.000 0.486 0.000
Board Size 7.764 8.000 7.888 8.000
Board Independence 0.792 0.818 0.788 0.833
CEO Pay Slice 0.307 0.304 0.301 0.303
CFO Pay Slice 0.175 0.177 0.177 0.174
CEO Age 54.263 54.000 54.369 54.000
CFO Age 49.906 50.000 49.184 49.000
CEO Tenure 7.165 4.000 7.061 5.000
CFO Tenure 3.579 2.000 3.872 3.000
Prior CxO Turnover 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 ***
Note:  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
MIS Quarterly Vol. 40 No. 3/September 2016 699
Masli et al./IT-Related Deficiencies and CEO/CFO Turnover
Table 4. IT Material Weaknesses and CEO Turnover
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Number of IT Weaknesses 0.168***
IT Control Oversight–Internal -0.006 0.014
IT Capability 0.024 0.016
Software Development 0.014 0.017
IT Architecture 0.166*** 0.157***
IT Control Oversight–External 0.133** 0.132**
CIO Reporting Probability 0.013 0.011 0.001 0.004
CIO Turnover Probability 0.075 0.022 -0.040 -0.019
CEO IT Expert 0.034 0.028 0.029 0.027 0.028
Number of Non-IT Weaknesses 0.096* 0.094* 0.082 0.094* 0.085
Size -0.109 -0.148* -0.114 -0.098 -0.106
Profit -0.207*** -0.176** -0.199*** -0.231*** -0.222***
Restatement -0.003 -0.008 -0.025 -0.031 -0.027
Going Concern -0.016 -0.017 -0.014 -0.044 -0.007
Growth 0.056 0.052 0.051 0.056 0.056
Leverage -0.012 -0.021 -0.035 -0.025 -0.027
Institutional Ownership 0.137** 0.131** 0.138** 0.147** 0.144**
Audit Committee Effective 0.015 0.016 -0.009 0.009 0.004
CEO as Chairman -0.024 -0.023 -0.038 -0.039 -0.040
Board Size 0.083 0.088 0.083 0.073 0.076
Board Independence 0.125** 0.098 0.116* 0.138** 0.129*
CEO Pay Slice 0.063 0.063 0.061 0.058 0.061
CEO Age -0.113* -0.113* -0.097 -0.123** -0.123**
CEO Tenure -0.139* -0.139* -0.136* -0.134* -0.133*
Prior CXO Turnover -0.057 -0.062 -0.088 -0.074 -0.078
Intercept -1.282* -1.092 -1.442* -1.296* -1.267*
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 546 546 546 546 546
p-value for Wald χ² < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
Area Under ROC Curve 0.685 0.686 0.703 0.714 0.717
Note:  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
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Table 5. IT Material Weaknesses and CFO Turnover
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Number of IT Weaknesses 0.145**
IT Control Oversight–Internal 0.204*** 0.203***
IT Capability 0.002 0.009
Software Development 0.047 0.040
IT Architecture -0.055 -0.052
IT Control Oversight–External -0.058 -0.072
CIO Reporting Probability -0.007 -0.013 -0.012 -0.007
CIO Turnover Probability -0.218*** -0.264*** -0.221** -0.185**
CFO IT Expert 0.097 0.106 0.102 0.102 0.097
Number of Non-IT Weaknesses 0.171*** 0.174*** 0.164*** 0.152*** 0.145***
Size 0.101 0.215*** 0.244*** 0.228*** 0.201**
Profit -0.134** -0.238*** -0.257*** -0.235*** -0.215**
Restatement 0.118** 0.137** 0.123** 0.137** 0.135**
Going Concern 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.030 0.030
Growth 0.027 0.042 0.039 0.033 0.035
Leverage -0.096* -0.069 -0.079 -0.080 -0.081
Institutional Ownership -0.022 -0.010 -0.003 0.003 -0.005
Audit Committee Effective 0.036 0.031 0.011 -0.001 0.009
CEO as Chairman -0.075 -0.077 -0.080 -0.074 -0.076
Board Size 0.034 0.014 0.009 0.019 0.023
Board Independence -0.042 0.031 0.049 0.044 0.031
CEO Pay Slice 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.018 0.016
CFO Pay Slice -0.063 -0.068 -0.069 -0.079 -0.079
CFO Age 0.042 0.043 0.027 0.031 0.030
CFO Tenure -0.132** -0.143** -0.139** -0.158*** -0.161***
Prior CxO Turnover -0.002 0.019 0.013 0.027 0.023
Intercept -0.800 -1.290* -1.418* -1.440* -1.258*
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 518 518 518 518 518
p-value for Wald χ² < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
Area Under ROC Curve 0.687 0.698 0.709 0.717 0.714
Note:  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
of CFO turnover.  These results provide strong support for
Hypothesis 2.  With regard to the influence of specific IT
material weakness categories on CFO turnover, Models 4 and
5 (using, respectively, indicator and count variables) indicate
that IT Control Oversight–Internal (p-value < 0.01) to be a
significant predictor—providing moderate support for
Hypothesis 4.
To address potential concerns related to endogeneity, we
performed the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure as an
additional untabulated analysis.  The first-stage probit regres-
sion model determines the likelihood of a firm having one or
more IT material weaknesses.  The sample for the first stage
model includes all of the IT material weakness firms and their
matched control firms.  The dependent variable is equal to one
if the firm reports IT material weaknesses, and zero otherwise. 
For the set of independent variables, we include CIO
reporting probability, CEO IT Expert, CFO IT Expert, Size,
CEO as Chairman, Board Size, Board Independence, Auditor
Office Size, Auditor Industry Specialist, Number of Non-IT
Weaknesses, Audit Committee Effective, CEO Pay Slice, CFO
Pay Slice, CEO Age, CFO Age, CEO Tenure, CFO Tenure,
Growth, Leverage, and Institutional Ownership.
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From the first-stage probit regression, we calculate the inverse
mills ratio (Lambda)—the ratio of the probability density
function to the cumulative distribution function—and include
it as an additional control variable in the second-stage CEO
and CFO turnover probit regressions (Models 1–5 in Tables
4 and 5).  We find that the coefficient for the inverse mills
ratio (Lambda) is not significant (p-value > 0.10) in any of the
second-stage regression models, suggesting that selection bias
is not a concern.  More importantly, the results pertaining to
our main independent variables Number of IT Weaknesses and
the five IT material weakness factors (IT Control Oversight–
Internal, IT Capability, Software Development, IT Architec-
ture, IT Control Oversight–External) remain qualitatively
unchanged from the results reported in Tables 4 and 5.  Over-
all, the results help alleviate concerns that our study’s results
are driven by endogeneity.
Discussion
Organizations’ most senior executives face a conundrum
regarding IT management.  Because of personal limitations
regarding time availability and IT expertise, executive
leadership teams tend to delegate most, if not all, IT manage-
ment responsibilities to a specialist-subordinate (e.g., a CIO). 
While mindfully undertaken managerial delegation is advan-
tageous for both the delegating executive and this executive’s
organization, the delegating executive may suffer negative
consequences if ineffectively handled delegated activities
result in serious operational, regulatory/legal, or competitive
vulnerabilities.  However, little guidance currently exists to
aid a senior executive in identifying the IT management
responsibilities for which s/he is likely to be held accountable.
An especially prominent set of IT-related vulnerabilities in the
post-SOX context are those associated with public firms’
financial reporting processes.  The identification of IT
material weaknesses in a firm’s SOX 404 reports raises the
specter of SOX violations, potentially posing significant
negative consequences for the firm (e.g., a loss of legitimacy)
and for the firm’s CEO and CFO (e.g., executive turnover).
Our empirical study has produced substantial evidence of
heightened CEO and CFO turnover likelihoods when firms’
SOX 404 reports identify IT material weaknesses.  Impor-
tantly, CEOs and CFOs were observed to be selectively
affected by serious IT deficiencies.  For CEOs, deficiencies
traced to IT Architecture and to IT Control Oversight–
External were associated with higher turnover likelihoods.
For CFOs, deficiencies traced to IT Control Oversight–
Internal were associated with higher turnover likelihoods.
These findings provide empirical evidence supporting the
often-voiced call for an organization’s most senior executives
to personally engage with IT management and clearly
identify, within the financial reporting context, specific IT
management responsibilities for CEOs and for CFOs.
These empirical results are largely consistent with our
expectation that CEOs would be held accountable for global
IT management responsibilities (i.e., IT Architecture) and that
CFOs would be held accountable for demand-side IT
management responsibilities (i.e., IT Control Oversight–
Internal).  However, two inconsistencies were observed. 
First, CEOs were also found to suffer a higher likelihood of
turnover with IT Control Oversight–External deficiencies,
which we had classified as a supply-side IT management
responsibility.  Second, serious deficiencies with IT Capa-
bility and with Software Development were not associated
with higher CEO or CFO turnover likelihoods (or, with higher
CIO turnover likelihoods).  These two inconsistencies are
now discussed.
As the component activities associated with IT Control Over-
sight–External (i.e., IT outsourcing and spreadsheet
development) involve the direct handling of IT activities, we
conceptualized it as a supply-side IT management respon-
sibility for which CIOs would be accountable.  As expected,
we did find (see Appendix C) IT Control Oversight–External
to influence CIO turnover.  However, after controlling for the
probability of CIO turnover, IT Control Oversight–External
did influence the likelihood of CEO turnover.  In retrospect,
this outcome seems reasonable.  Situations frequently arise
where a CIO is unable to convince other senior executives
(reporting upward to the CEO) to follow established global
policies (in this case, policies regarding IT outsourcing or
spreadsheet development).  In such situations, only the CEO
holds sufficient power to force compliance with contested
global policies.  Accordingly, we suggest that IT Control
Oversight–External has two aspects:  a supply-side aspect
dealing with technical and operational concerns, and a global
aspect dealing with strategic and policy concerns.
Neither IT Capability nor Software Development was
observed to influence CEO or CFO (or CIO) turnover likeli-
hoods.  We offer two possible explanations.  First, these
results may be attributed to the financial reporting context:
both IT Capability and Software Development, while impor-
tant IT management responsibilities, might be too causally
distant from the production of firm’s financial reports.  Dif-
ferent outcomes might very well be observed with other
functional contexts.  Second, these results may be attributed
to the descriptions of IT material weaknesses in SOX 404
audit reports, to our coding of these data, and to the explora-
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tory factor analysis, each of which has comingled to some
extent the demand-side and supply-side aspects of IT Capa-
bility and Software Development.  Measurement procedures
able to separate these demand-side and supply-side aspects
might lessen the noise in our data set such that subsequent
analyses would surface distinctive demand-side/supply-side
influences for IT Capability and for Software Development.
Limitations
There are five major limitations to consider in interpreting our
results.  First, the SOX standards require substantial judgment
on the part of the reporting firm and its auditors.  A quali-
tatively similar control issue at one firm may have risen to the
level of a material weakness and been included in our sample
but may not have at another firm.  To some extent, we were
able to discount the consequences of variant auditor behavior
by comparing the SOX 404 reports of “Big Four versus
Other” external auditors without uncovering systematic
effects (see footnote 16).  However, more nuanced analysis
might surface significant auditor biases.  Second, our data
examines the initial wave of SOX 404 reports (i.e., 2004–
2007) which may prove markedly different than SOX 404
reports in subsequent time periods.  Third, some of the execu-
tive turnover outcomes we report are likely to be voluntary.
To address this possibility, we controlled for CEO age and for
CFO age.  Fourth, the derived IT material weakness cate-
gories were empirically determined (using data limited to the
financial reporting context) rather than theoretically derived.
Our categorical structure would certainly benefit from similar
empirical efforts conducted in this and other functional con-
texts and from theoretical efforts aimed at developing
comprehensive, compelling conceptualizations of senior
executives’ IT management  responsibilities.  Fifth, and
perhaps most important, the implications of the current study
are limited to hazards associated with the post-SOX financial
reporting context.  Numerous other types of IT risks exist
(Smith et al. 2001; Tanriverdi and Ruefli 2004; Wallace et al.
2004) that similarly pose hazards for firms; we strongly
encourage research examining senior executives’ IT manage-
ment responsibilities in other IT risk contexts.
Contributions to Information
Systems Research
Nolan (2012) concluded his assessment of Boeing’s IT
management challenges with its 787 program by stating
The “elephant” in the Boeing board room, as well in
the board rooms of many modern corporations, is
ubiquitous IT spread throughout the corporation, but
no IT strategic focus and leadership…important
research questions must be addressed.  First, what is
the gestalt of a corporation’s IT?  Second, what
should be the IT strategic focus? Third, what stra-
tegic IT leadership is required? Fourth, what action
plan is required to execute the IT strategy? (p. 101).
This study’s conceptualizations and empirical findings make
two important contributions to our discipline’s establishing a
new gestalt regarding IT management.
First, we anticipate that our work will initiate a recasting of
how our discipline thinks about IT management, especially
with regard to terms such as IT strategy and IT leadership. 
Today, customer-, product-, and process-driven competitive
positions and strategic actions (i.e., demand-side issues) are
increasingly formulated through IT-infused cognitions and
implemented via robust business platforms and robust digital
platforms applying, as appropriate, well-conceived and timely
digital innovations (Sambamurthy and Zmud 2015).  But IT
strategy and IT leadership are as well needed elsewhere if
sought competitive positions are to be achieved and if taken
strategic actions are to be successful:  cross-unit and extra-
organizational IT-related synergies need to be identified,
constituted, and coordinated (e.g., global issues); and effi-
cient, effective, secure, and agile business/digital platforms
need to be designed, fabricated, implemented, operated, and
evolved (i.e., supply-side issues).  IT management thus is best
conceived of as a polycentric, rather than monocentric,
activity system (Constantinides and Barrett 2015).
As an illustration of a polycentric view of IT management,
consider the ideal IT management profiles identified by
Guillemette and Pare (2012):  partner, system provider, archi-
tecture builder, technology leader and project coordinator.
Applying a monocentric perspective on IT management
characteristic of our discipline, Guillemette and Pare argue
that organizations’ leaders should first identify and then adopt
that profile which best aligns with three contingency factors:
how IT is perceived by top management, how the CIO is
perceived by top management, and how IT-literate are top
management.  Our perspective is quite different.  Polycentric
IT management assumes the existence of numerous distinct,
but interrelated, IT management activity systems (e.g., within
the office of the CEO, within offices of business unit presi-
dents, within the offices of functional executives, within the
offices of IT executives, etc.), each of which holds unique IT
management responsibilities requiring various combinations
of the capabilities represented by the five ideal IT manage-
ment profiles.  We expect systematic variation will be
observed both in the number and natures of distinct IT
MIS Quarterly Vol. 40 No. 3/September 2016 703
Masli et al./IT-Related Deficiencies and CEO/CFO Turnover
management activity systems across differing types of
organizations and in the nature of the capability profiles
observed across distinct types of IT management activity
systems.  We strongly encourage theoretical and empirical
research that assesses these expectations.
Second, interweaving our ideas regarding organizations’
polycentric IT management activity systems with research
examining senior executives’ IT-related structural, cognitive,
and relational social capitals (Preston and Karahanna 2009)
promises to provide a rich conceptual schema with which to
envision and portray the new gestalt regarding polycentric IT
management.  If the ideas we raise hold merit, particular
groupings of executives and managers should be brought
together in directing, monitoring, and, as needed, redirecting
specific IT management activities.  In other words, we posit
that the organizations seen as being successful in their deploy-
ment of IT will have established numerous “systems of
knowing” (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999) constellations,
with each constellation focused on specific IT management
activities and involving that group of executives/managers
holding an appropriate assemblage of industry, business, and
technology knowledge/insight.  Importantly, establishing
these groups is likely to involve (1) the use of temporal and
topical interlocks (Sambamurthy and Zmud 2015) that intro-
duce, respectively, a group’s organizational memory and an
awareness of other groups’ actions into ensuing deliberations
and (2) a layered nesting of related groups that gives 
“autonomy to all stakeholders to govern themselves as long as
their self-governance does not affect others in the same or
higher layers” (Constantinides and Barret 2015, p. 54).  We
strongly encourage research that examines (1) the existence
and nature of such system of knowing constellations, (2) how
these constellations are established, operated, and evolved,
(3) how interdependencies across the constellations are
handled, and (4) best practices exhibited by constellation
participants in producing exceptional performance outcomes.
Contributions to Management Research
Applying arguments related to stigmatization as a conse-
quence of organizations’ loss of legitimacy (Wiesenfeld et al.
2008) and working within the post-SOX financial reporting
context, Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) linked CEO and CFO turn-
over events to a specific organizational failure event:  a public
firm’s financial restatement.  By explaining CEO and CFO
turnover as a consequence of this specific negative event for
which CEOs and CFOs are explicitly held accountable,
Arthaud-Day et al. reduced the causal ambiguity previously
found to characterize the relationship between poor organi-
zational performance and executive turnover.  Our work
further reduces this causal ambiguity by positing and con-
firming CEO and CFO accountabilities for distinct IT
management responsibilities.
Our work also contributes to research on managerial delega-
tion by clarifying the nature of a delegating executive’s
retained accountabilities.  We offer two insights.  First, stake-
holders are likely to hold an executive filling a general
manager role accountable for performance failures regarding
(1) the preservation of strategic flexibility and (2) the up-
holding of organization-wide or unit-wide (for unit-level
executives) strategies and policies.  Second, stakeholders are
likely to hold an executive filling a functional manager role
accountable for performance failures regarding a functional
domain’s strategic or operational effectiveness.
Implications for Information
Systems Practice
While our findings support the often-voiced admonition for
senior executives to personally engage with IT management
activities, we refine this admonition by advocating that senior
executives holding particular managerial roles should, prag-
matically, personally engage with specific, but not all, IT
management activities.  It thereby becomes critically impor-
tant for an organization’s IT function to recognize which
senior executives need to be kept aware of which IT man-
agement activities and then to devise appropriate reporting
systems.  But, designing executive-focused IT management
reporting systems is fraught with challenges, including but not
limited to presenting complex, technical content such that
provisioned content addresses the issues most relevant to a
particular senior executive and is understood by this execu-
tive; meaningfully placing reported information within
constantly shifting business and technology landscapes; and
accurately characterizing associated risks along with the
statuses of in-place risk management structures, tactics, and
actions. 
For the most part, little scholarly research has been directed
at executive-focused IT management reporting systems.  An
exception is work by Mitra et al. (2011) that suggests a port-
folio of metrics to be communicated by the IT function to an
organization’s senior executives.  We advocate future
research that extends the Mitra el al. portfolio of metrics,
tailors such metrics to meet the needs of particular senior
executives, empirically assesses the meaningfulness of such
metrics, and exposes the weaknesses of alternative designs for
presenting technical information to senior executives.
A second important responsibility of an organization’s IT
function involves the IT function’s leadership team working
with the organization’s executive leadership team to design
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and implement a polycentric IT governance system (Constan-
tinides and Barrett 2015) that engages particular senior
executives in specific IT management activity systems.  Here,
implemented governance structures and processes should be
designed such that minimal demands are placed on senior
executives while still enabling the executives to direct,
monitor and, if needed, redirect associated IT-related
activities.  While considerable research exists on IT gover-
nance systems (e.g., Fonstad and Robertson 2006; Huang et
al. 2010; Ross et al. 2006; Schwarz and Hirschheim 2003;
Weill 2004; Williams and Karahanna 2013), the lenses that
have been applied have not examined the roles or obligations
of particular senior executives—or, to be precise, of par-
ticular groups of senior executives—regarding specific IT
management activities.  We encourage future research that
applies such a lens. 
Conclusion
We undertook this study to answer the question:  For which
IT management responsibilities are particular senior execu-
tives held accountable for serious IT deficiencies?  Our
empirical findings establish that CEOs and CFOs are, in fact,
held accountable for distinct, serious IT deficiencies.  While
our study is couched within a financial reporting context, we
are confident that comparable findings would be observed in
other organizational contexts.  In describing the implications
of our work, we offer a fresh gestalt regarding IT manage-
ment.  We sincerely hope that our ideas, findings, and
suggestions for future research gain traction with other
scholars such that collective progress is made in improving
our understanding of IT management within today’s
organizational contexts.
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Appendix A
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and CEO/CFO Accountability
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was established to strengthen internal controls over financial reporting by U.S. public firms and, as
a consequence, to increase investor and stakeholder confidence in published financial reports.  Among the many SOX provisions, SOX 404
requires an annual assessment by the firm’s executive management and external auditor of the firm’s internal controls over financial reporting
(SEC 2003).  The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) formally defines internal controls over financial reporting as (SEC 2003:
Section II.A.3.): 
A process designed by, or under the supervision of, the registrant’s principal executive and principal financial officers, or
persons performing similar functions, and effected by the registrant’s board of directors, management and other personnel,
to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
 The SOX regulation, thus, requires a firm’s executive management to make an annual assessment on the effectiveness of the firm’s internal
controls.  This process typically consists of the following:  (1) identifying significant financial systems (i.e., identify systems that process
accounts exceeding materiality thresholds); (2) documenting each system’s internal controls using narratives, questionnaires, and/or flowcharts;
(3) confirming an understanding of step 2 by conducting walkthroughs (i.e., follow transactions through the systems and all control points to
make sure that all internal controls are working); (4) assessing the risk of material misstatement within each financial system; (5) identifying
the key controls over financial reporting; and (6) testing these key controls.  Management documents its assessment on the effectiveness of
controls, including the existence of material weaknesses, in the Annual Report in Item 9A, “Management’s Report on Internal Controls over
Financial Reporting.”  If one or more material weaknesses exist, internal controls are not considered to be effective.
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For accelerated and large accelerated firms, SOX 404 also requires that external auditors attest to management’s assessment of internal controls
as part of the annual financial statement audit.  Auditors follow the same basic steps described in the prior paragraph and may rely on
documentation provided by management.  Auditors must issue their own report on the effectiveness of internal controls and, if any material
weaknesses exist, the auditor must express an adverse opinion on internal controls over financial reporting and identify these material
weaknesses in the audit report.  The presence of a material weakness, thus, should first be identified by management and then verified by the
external auditor.
The SOX provisions require that the CFO and CEO be held responsible for executing their fiduciary duties (i.e., establishing and maintaining
their firm’s internal controls regarding financial reporting) (Hoitash et al. 2012).  The executive management of firms for which material
weaknesses have been reported is likely to be seen as having underperformed these fiduciary responsibilities and, as a result, may face
disciplinary actions including legal sanctions and nonlegal penalties (e.g., job terminations and subsequent difficulties in obtaining comparable
managerial positions).  The SOX regulations can impose legal sanctions of up to a $5 million fine and/or up to 20 years in prison (Geiger and
Taylor 2003) on CEOs and CFOs implicated in fraudulent financial reporting.  Nonlegal penalties can also affect CEOs and CFOs of firms
disclosing SOX-related material weaknesses.  For example, Beneish et al. (2008) found firms identified as having disclosed material weaknesses
to have experienced significant stock price declines, and Li et al. (2010) find such firms to have experienced a significantly higher rate of CFO
turnover.
Appendix B
Exploratory Factor Analysis and COBIT Mapping
Using count variables for each of the 16 identified IT material weaknesses, we applied principal component analysis with varimax rotation. 
Only factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1 were retained, and an IT material weakness was associated with a factor if its loading was greater
than 0.40.  Two of these 16 IT material weaknesses (lack of control and lack of documentation) were observed to load on multiple factors; these
two IT material weaknesses were consequently dropped from further factor analysis.  The factor analysis of the remaining 14 IT material
weaknesses produced the factor structure presented in Table B1.  Bolded and underlined IT material weakness coefficients indicate those
associated with each IT material weakness category (or, factor).  
Table B1.  Exploratory Factor Analysis












Segregation of Duties 0.723 0.14 -0.114 -0.081 -0.096
Backup/Recovery/Security 0.579 -0.152 0.171 -0.077 0.24
Access Control 0.759 0.048 -0.159 -0.071 -0.098
IT Management Oversight 0.645 0.244 0.204 -0.024 0.173
IT Skillbase 0.28 0.655 0.115 -0.013 -0.143
Business Analysis -0.248 0.493 0.234 0.008 0.273
Infrastructure/Operations 0.129 0.768 -0.222 0.054 -0.083
Software Development 0.395 0.311 0.494 0.27 -0.036
System Implementation 0.043 -0.112 0.61 0.212 0.021
Data Integrity -0.115 0.091 0.767 -0.242 -0.189
Nonintegrated
applications/systems
-0.116 0.119 -0.009 0.646 -0.013
Too complex systems -0.048 -0.079 0.078 0.746 -0.026
Spreadsheet Integrity -0.076 0.046 -0.063 -0.214 0.739
Outsourcing 0.137 -0.107 -0.068 0.143 0.571
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We validated this factor structure by mapping it to the COBIT framework.  Table B2 provides top-down and bottom-up mappings.  Three issues
are noteworthy.  First, the top-down mapping indicates that the five IT material weakness categories derived in the factor analysis map
reasonably well with the four high-level IT process domains:  Plan and Organize, Acquire and Implement, Deliver and Support, and Monitor
and Evaluate.  This suggests that our five IT material weakness categories provide adequate coverage of the COBIT framework.  Second, the
bottom-up mapping suggests that considerable overlap (in terms of IT-related activities) occurs across the COBIT framework’s high-level IT
process domains.  The further analysis summarized as Table B3 corroborates (via COBIT’s indication of how IT process components serve
as input to other IT process components) this overlap.  This overlap is indicative of an inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, in deriving a
“clean” one-to-one mapping of SOX 404 IT material weaknesses from existing frameworks, such as the COBIT framework.  Third, the COBIT
framework is largely silent with regard to the derived IT Control Oversight–External IT material weakness category, most notably with regard
to spreadsheet development/use by an organization’s non-IT professionals.  Nonetheless, explicit statements of IT problem areas associated
with the use of spreadsheets in the processing of financial transaction processing and reporting were quite evident in the collected SOX 404
reports.
Finally, the third column of Table B4 provides a mapping of these five IT material weakness categories to the three IT management
responsibility domains (global, demand-side, and supply-side) applied in developing Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4.  Justifications (see the
fourth column of Table B4) for this mapping refer to explanations developed earlier regarding senior executive responsibilities regarding these
three IT management responsibility domains.













Ensuring that proper internal
controls have been established





PO4:  IT Processes, Structure & Relationships
PO6:  Internal Control Aims & Directions
PO9:  IT Risk Framework
DS4:  Ensure Continuous Service
DS5:  Ensure Systems Security
DS12:  Manage Physical Environment
ME1:  Monitor & Evaluate IT Performance
ME2:  Monitor & Evaluate Internal Control
ME3:  Ensure Compliance with External Requirements




knowledge, work practices and
processes, etc.) exist to analyze,
design, build, implement, operate







PO7:  IT Human Resources
AI1:  Identify Automated Systems
AI3:  Acquire & Maintain Technology Infrastructure
AI6:  Change Management
DS3:  Manage Performance and Capacity
DS8:  Manage Service Desk
DS11:  Manage Data
DS13:  Manage Operations
Software
Development
Ensuring the effective design,
development, testing, installation,





PO10:  Manage Projects
AI2:  Acquire & Maintain Application Software
AI7:  Install & Accredit Solutions
DS7:  Educate & Train Users
IT Architecture
Ensuring that enterprise and
technology architectures exist to





PO2:  Information Architecture




Ensuring that proper controls
have been established for finan-
cial information systems and
associated technology services
developed and/or operated by
entities other than an organiza-
tion’s internal IT function.
Monitor & Evaluate
(ME)
AI5:  Procure IT Resources
DS2:  Manage Third-party Services
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PO4:  IT Processes, Structure & Relationships
PO6:  Internal Control Aims & Directions
PO9:  IT Risk Framework
DS4:  Ensure Continuous Service
DS5:  Ensure Systems Security
DS12:  Manage Physical Environment
ME1:  Monitor & Evaluate IT Performance
ME2:  Monitor & Evaluate Internal Control
ME3:  Ensure Compliance with External
Requirements






























PO7:  IT Human Resources
AI1:  Identify Automated Systems
AI3:  Acquire & Maintain Technology
Infrastructure
AI6:  Change Management
DS3:  Manage Performance and Capacity
DS8:  Manage Service Desk
DS11:  Manage Data





























PO10:  Manage Projects
AI2:  Acquire & Maintain Application Software
AI7:  Install & Accredit Solutions














PO2:  Information Architecture









AI5:  Procure IT Resources





aX indicates the IT process serves as a direct input to at least one of the IT processes representing a top-down IT process domains.
bY indicates the IT process serves as an indirect input (i.e., via a ‘bottom-up’ IT process) to at least one of the IT processes representing a top-down
IT process domain.
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Ensuring that proper internal controls
have been established for financial
information systems and associated
technology services.
Demand-Side
Fiduciary responsibilities regarding financial systems are
core responsibilities of the CFO (Hoitash et al. 2012; Hsu
and Liao 2012; Li et al. 2010; Wang 2010).
IT Capability
Ensuring that appropriate capa-
bilities (e.g., employees’ knowledge,
work practices and processes, etc.)
exist to analyze, design, build,
implement, operate and maintain




The CFO provisions the financial expertise to determine
the requirements for and to assess the integrity of installed
financial systems (Li et al. 2010).
The CIO provisions the technical expertise to analyze,
design, build, operate and maintain financial systems




Ensuring the effective design,
development, testing, installation
and maintenance of financial




The CFO and the CFO’s direct reports possess the
knowledge and experience to determine the requirements
for and to assess the integrity of installed financial systems
(Li et al. 2010). 
The CIO and the CIO’s direct reports possess the technical
expertise to analyze, design, build, operate and maintain
financial systems (Chen et al. 2011; Martin et al. 1995;
Zmud and Sambamurthy 2012),
IT Architecture
Ensuring that enterprise and
technology architectures exist to
rationalize and integrate an
organization’s portfolio of information
systems.
Global
It is the responsibility of the CEO to ensure that an organi-
zation’s enterprise architecture (reflected in installed
business and technology platforms) enables, rather than
obstructs, significant financial system changes imple-
mented in support of current and future business strategies
(Hirschheim et al. 2010; Nadkami and Hermann 2010;




Ensuring that proper controls have
been established for financial
information systems and associated
technology services developed
and/or operated by entities other
than an organization’s internal IT
function.
Supply-Side
It is the responsibility of the CIO to provide oversight
ensuring that applicable policies and procedures are
followed when financial information systems and the
technology services enabling these information systems
are developed and/or operated by entities other than the
internal IT function (Chen et al. 2011).
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Appendix C
IT Weaknesses and CIO Turnover
 Model 1a Model 2b
IT Control Oversight–Internal -0.051 0.079
IT Capability 0.452 0.430
Software Development 0.218 0.029
IT Architecture 0.082 0.335
IT Control Oversight–External 0.569** 0.748*
CIO Reporting Probability 0.004 0.003





Going Concern -0.571 -0.581
Growth -0.062 -0.065
Institutional Ownership -0.439 -0.435
Audit Committee Effective -0.825 -0.768
CEO as Chairman 0.061 0.060
Board Size -0.059 -0.050
Board Independence 1.405* 1.415*
CEO Pay Slice -0.488 -0.422
CFO Pay Slice 3.876 3.807
Intercept -2.817** -2.827**
Year Indicators Yes Yes
Number of observations 216 216
p-value for Wald Chi2 0.054 0.085
ROC Curve 0.721 0.720
aIndicator operationalization
bCount operationalization
Note:   ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
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Appendix D
Correlation Matrix
Table D1. CEO Turnover, Material Weakness, CIO Reporting and Turnover Probabilities (n = 546)
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 CEO Turnover 1.00
2 Number of IT Weaknesses 0.13 1.00
3 Number of Non-IT Weaknesses 0.14 0.28 1.00
4 IT Control Oversight–Internal 0.05 0.62 0.22 1.00
5 IT Capability 0.04 0.37 0.10 0.24 1.00
6 Software Development 0.06 0.59 0.10 0.38 0.26 1.00
7 IT Architecture 0.13 0.18 -0.01 0.09 0.14 0.22 1.00
8 IT Control Oversight–External 0.09 0.42 0.20 0.25 0.10 0.12 -0.01 1.00
9 CIO Reporting Probability -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06 1.00
10 CIO Turnover Probability 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.42 -0.21 1.00
Note:  p-values of significance below 0.05 are bolded.
Table D2.  CFO Turnover, Material Weakness, CIO Reporting and Turnover Probabilities (n = 518)
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 CFO Turnover 1.00
2 Number of IT Weaknesses 0.12 1.00
3 Number of Non-IT Weaknesses 0.17 0.29 1.00
4 IT Control Oversight–Internal 0.16 0.63 0.22 1.00
5 IT Capability 0.07 0.41 0.11 0.23 1.00
6 Software Development 0.09 0.59 0.11 0.38 0.28 1.00
7 IT Architecture -0.02 0.20 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.24 1.00
8 IT Control Oversight–External -0.03 0.44 0.18 0.25 0.12 0.12 -0.01 1.00
9 CIO Reporting Probability -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06 1.00
10 CIO Turnover Probability 0.09 0.23 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.43 -0.21 1.00
Note:  p-values of significance below 0.05 are bolded.
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Table D3.  CEO Turnover and Other Control Variables (n = 546)
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 CEO Turnover 1.00
2 CEO IT Expert 0.08 1.00
3 Size -0.08 -0.11 1.00
4 Profit -0.20 -0.21 0.36 1.00
5 Restatement 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.03 1.00
6 Going Concern 0.08 0.07 -0.20 -0.39 0.04 1.00
7 Growth 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 1.00
8 Leverage 0.04 -0.15 0.07 -0.18 0.04 0.14 -0.10 1.00
9 Institutional Ownership 0.03 -0.07 0.46 0.25 0.06 -0.08 -0.14 0.01 1.00
10 Audit Committee Effective 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.03 -0.01 1.00
11 CEO as Chairman -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.03 1.00
12 Board Size 0.02 -0.19 0.36 0.10 -0.03 -0.06 -0.15 0.20 0.09 -0.04 -0.09 1.00
13 Board Independence 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.16 0.03 -0.05 0.11 1.00
14 CEO Pay Slice 0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.09 1.00
15 CEO Age -0.14 -0.23 0.05 0.13 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.23 0.14 -0.02 0.11 1.00
16 CEO Tenure -0.17 -0.11 0.06 0.18 -0.02 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 0.02 -0.05 0.40 0.00 -0.14 0.02 0.41 1.00
17 Prior CXO Turnover -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.00 1.00
 Note:  p-values of significance below 0.05 are bolded.
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Table D3.  CFO Turnover and other control variables (n = 518)
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 CFO Turnover 1.00
2 CFO IT Expert 0.14 1.00
3 Size 0.02 -0.10 1.00
4 Profit -0.13 -0.23 0.35 1.00
5 Restatement 0.13 0.04 0.00 -0.03 1.00
6 Going Concern 0.06 0.07 -0.20 -0.40 0.07 1.00
7 Growth 0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 1.00
8 Leverage -0.04 -0.18 0.06 -0.18 0.04 0.17 -0.10 1.00
9 Institutional
Ownership
-0.03 -0.09 0.45 0.25 0.06 -0.10 -0.14 0.00 1.00
10 Audit Committee
Effective
0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.04 -0.01 1.00
11 CEO as Chairman -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.10 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 1.00
12 Board Size 0.02 -0.12 0.38 0.10 -0.02 -0.07 -0.16 0.20 0.09 -0.02 -0.10 1.00
13 Board Independence -0.03 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.16 0.01 -0.05 0.12 1.00
14 CEO Pay Slice -0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.10 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.11 1.00
15 CFO Pay Slice -0.04 0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.13 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.28 1.00
16 CFO Age 0.00 -0.05 0.13 0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.03 1.00
17 CFO Tenure -0.14 -0.24 0.10 0.16 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.25 1.00
18 Prior CXO Turnover -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 1.00
Note:  p-values of significance below 0.05 are bolded
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